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CLARIFICATION OF HOMICIDE LAW IN CALIFORNIA
FROM RECENT DECISIONS
BY WILLIAM W. COSHOW
In 1936, James Pike, writing on homicide in Cali-
fornia,1 expressed himself in substance that although
the law involving homicide should be of maximum clari-
ty, it was in fact in great confusion. Since that time,
beginning with People v. Albertson 23 Cal 2/550 and cul-
minating in People v. Wells 33 Cal 2/330, the California
Supreme Court has handed down several decisions which
have done much to clarify the law on those aspects of
homicide which had created the most confusion. This
article will attempt to relate certain chanzes and re-
considerations which have occured in the past five or
six years.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE DEGREES OF MURDER
Commencing with People v. Holt 25 Cal 2/69 and
continuing through several subsequent cases the Court
established that for a homicide to be murder in the
first degree it must fit into one of three categories.
A - Any killing committed in the perpetration or attempt
to perpetrate arson, robbery, rape, burglary, or mayFiem
is murder in the first degree. Penal Code 189. These
killings need not be intentional, in fact may be acci-
dental, but by force of the statute are first degree
murder.
2
B - . . . all murder which is perpetrated by means of
poison, or lying in wait, torture . . . is murder in
the first degree." Penal Code 189.
This differs from the former categorv in that the kil-
ling cannot be accidental. "There must be an intent to
inflict suffering, though not necessarily death, by
means of poison or torture which results in the death
of the one poisoned or tortured."
8 Apparently to sustain
a conviction of murder in the first degree on the basis
1 - See James A. Pike "nhat Is Second Degree Murder in California?" 9 S. Cal. Law Rev.
/12. People v. Holt 25 Cal. 2/59 at 84 - 92.
2 - People v. Holt 25 Cal. 2/59 at 83 - 92. People v. Lindley 26 Cal. 21780 at 791.
People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 182. People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 135-6.
3 - People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 182. People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 136.
of "lying in wait" it must be shown that the defendant
lay in wait with the intent to kill. The bare fact
that he lay in wait and then killed is not sufficient
unless the jury reasonably infers that the intent was
already formed.4
C - The third and last category of first degree murder
is a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. The
intent to kill must be formed with deliberation and pre-
meditation to constitute first degree- murder with the
lay definitions of deliberation and premediatation being
applied. 5
Murder is described in Section 187 of the Penal
Code as the " . . . unlawful killing of another human
being with malice aforethought." Penal Code 189 des-
cribes murder in the first degree in the three cate-
zories described above, and further states" . . . "all
other kinds of murder are of the second degree." Con-
sequently, one category of second degree murder is an
unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
thought without deliberation and premediatation. This
is the natural interpretation of a combined reading of
the two statutes, and this interpretation is now sup-
ported by the decisions.
6
JURY INSTRUCTIONS ONCE STANDARD THAT ARE NOW ERRONEOUS
With the new distinctions drawn between the de-
grees of murder has come a new attitude toward proper
jury instructions. Instructions which had been used
repeatedly to juries for years are now considered er-
roneous and there have been several reversals on that
ground. The trial courts had traditionally instructed
the juries as follows:
"There are certain kinds of murder which carry with them
conclusive evidence of premediatation . . . These cases
are of two classes . . . First - by means of poison, lying
in wait, torture . . . here the means used is conclusive
evidence of premeditation; Second - one of the felonies
enumerated in the statute (P.C. 189) . . . here the oc-
casion is made conclusive evidence of premeditation. When
4 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 890-L
5 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal 2/880 at 898. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 188.
People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 134. People v. Honeycutt 29 Cal. 2/52 at 60.
6 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 903. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 21164 at 181 - 2
People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 131 - 2.
the case comes within either of these classes the test
question: 'Is the killing willful, deliberate and ore-
meditated?' is answered by the statute itself . . . But
there is another and much larger class of cases included
in the definition of murder in the first degree . . . In
this class the legislature leaves the Jury to determine
from the evidence before them, the degree of the crime,
but prescribes for the governing of their deliberations
the same test which has been used by itself in determin-
ing the degree of the other two classes: to wit: The
deliberate and preconceived intent to kill." 7
The effect of this is to state that the Jury
should apply the same test in a case of a premediated
killing as it applies in a means or occasion killing.
This instruction is now considered error. To say that
the same test applies to the first two categories also
applies to the third is incorrect. The quoted instruc-
tion evolved from an attempt to fit the rationalization
for the common-law interpretation of the means (poison,
etc.) and occasion (five felonies) classes of murder
into the statute. The statute itself determines the
degree of murder in the first two categories, thereby
making consideration of premeditation superfluous. Jury-
men are laymen and are often confused by instructions
which are worded by and for legally trained minds. As
the present court states:
"Attempts to explain the statute to the jury in terms of
non-existent 'conclusive presumptions' tend more to con-
fuse than to enlighten a jury unfamiliar with the inac-
curate practice of stating rules of substantive law in
terms of rules of evidence." 8
A second instruction which has been declared to
be erroneous is the instruction often given to juries in
in an attempt to define murder and clarify the dis-
tinction in the two degrees of murder. The usual in-
struction formerly included the following:
. . . unless the evidence proves the existence in the
mind of' the slayer of the specific intent to take life.
If such specific intent exists at the time of such unlaw-
ful killing the offense committed would of course be
murder of the first degree." 9
7 - People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 135. People v. Bernard 28 Cal. 2/207 at
210 - 1. People v. Honeycutt 29 Cal. 2/52 at 59.
8 - People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 136.
9 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 898. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 178.
People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 131.
This is error because specific intent is an ele-
ment of voluntary manslaughter and murder of the second
degree as well as murder of the first degree. Voluntary
manslaughter is an intentional killing with sufficient
provocation existing to remove the element of malice
aforethought, which is of course necessary in murder of
either degree. Penal Code 187. Murder of the second
degree is an unlawful killing with malice aforethought
which is not deliberate and premeditated. Therefore to
instruct the jury that if they find specific intent
they must find murder in the first degree is prejudici-
ally erroneous. 10
Generally these instructions would also contain
another statement:
but still if you entertain a reasonable doubt whe-
ther the said killing was willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated, then in such case you cannot find the defendant
guilty of murder in the first degree."
The present Court approves this instruction, but
the Court does not consider it to be corrective of the
above error. The two instructions together are conflict-
ing, contradictory, and confusing. They treat "specific
intent" and willful, deliberate and premeditated as if
they are synonomous. This is not the case and- since it
is not, then the second instruction does not cure the
ill of the first. Therefore these instructions, once
stock, now constitute reversible error.
1 1
Section 1105 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
"Upon a trial for murder, the commission of the homicide
by the defendant being proved, the burden of proving cir-
cumstances of mnitigation, or that justify or excuse it,
devolves upon him, unless the proof on the part of the
prosecuting tends to show that the crime committed only
amounts to manslaughter, or that the defendant was justi-
fiable or excusable."
It was customary for the trial courts to quote
this code section to the jury. This is now considered
error for two reasons. The statute distinguishes be-
tween murder, manslaughter, justifiable and excuseable
homicide and not between murder in the first degree and
second degree. In addition such an instruction can be
10 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 898. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 178.
People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 131 - 2.
11 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 901.
misconstrued by the jury as indicating that the defen-
dant must prove the mitigating circumstances by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence; whereas the true burden
placed on the defendant is merely to raise a reasonable
doubt.
By reading the statute verbatim to the jury, the
trial courts placed the burden of interpreting the sta-
tute upon the jury. Statutory interpretation is not a
function of the jury but rather a duty of the court.
The Court now treats Section 1105 as a rule of
procedure to prevent the trial court from erroneously
giving a directed verdict in favor of the defendant
and has indicated that even with explicit explanations
as to the effect of the statute, it would be better
left unread. 12 This position is taken because the bur-
den of proof in fact remains with the prosecution to
establish the crime and its degree. A reading of the
statute with even a proper explanation, would be con-
fusing to the laymen on the jury, because a proper
explanation conflicts with the wording of the statute.
The Court has held that, although the jury may reason-
ably infer that murder has been committed under the
circumstances described in the statute (Penal Code
1105) where the prosecution has not offered evidence
reasonably proving, or from which a reasonable infer-
ence may be drawn, establishing deliberation and pre-
meditation, then the degree of murder is that of the
second and not of the first. 13 This is because the
statute states murder without specifying the degree
and where such ambiguity exists in a statute it will
be interpreted in the light most favorable to the
defendant.
Another instructibn which attempted to apply
the common law to the statutes was one which stated:
"There need be . . . no appreciable space of time between
the intention to kill and the act of killing . . . a man
may do a thing deliberately from a moment's reflection
as well as pondering over the subject for a month or
year." And a man, " . . . can premeditate, that is think
before doing the act the moment he conceives the purpose,
12 - People v. Albertson 23 Cal. 2/550 at 586 - 7 (concurring opinion). People v.
Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at 895 - 6. People v. Lindley 25 Cal. 2/780 at 793 - 4.
People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 132 - 4. People v. Cornett 33 Cal. 2/33
at 42 - 45.
13 - People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2-164 at 178 - 181.
as well as if the act were the result of long preconcert or
preparation. " 14
This is error, the Court says, because it would
eliminate virtually the only distinction between first
and second degree murder. As we have already seen (ex-
cepting of course the "means" and "occasion" categories)
first degree murder is willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated, whereas second degree murder is with malice afore-
thought but is not deliberate and premeditated. If de-
liberation and premeditation can occur in a "flick of
an eyelash," how can there ever be a case of second de-
gree murder? The statute has provided for two degrees
of murder, and since the logical distinction between the
two rests on deliberation and premeditation, this sole
distinction should not be destroyed by giving connota-
tions to deliberation and premeditation which are con-
tradictory to the ordinary meaning of the two terms. The
Court has laid down the rule that deliberatio-n and pre-
meditation are to be given the definitions as expressed
in Webster's International Dictionary and as such pre-
sented to the jury. Then it is for the jury to apply
the terms thus defined to the facts presented in the
case and therefrom determine the class and degree of
the homicide. 15
These stock instructions, which are now disap-
proved, are not all of the instructions attempting to
distinguish the classes and degrees of homicide which
are now considered error. These are probably the most
important and are typical of instructions which would
be held to be objectionable. To generalize it could
'be stated that instructions must be clearly stated in
lay terms; they must be completely consistent with one
another; and they must distinguish the classes and de-




The Constitution of California (Article VL, Sect-
tion 4J) states:
"No judgment shall be set aside, or new trial granted, in
14 - People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 - at 134. People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880 at
892 - 3. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164 at 182. People v. Bernard 28 Cal.
2/207 at 212 - 3. People v. Honeycutt 29 Cal. 2/52 at 59 - 60. People v. Cor-
nett 33 Cal. 2/33 at 40 - 1.
15 - People v. Thomas 25 Cal. 2/880at900. People v. Bender 27 Cal. 2/164at 182-6.
People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121at 134- 5. People v. Bernard 28 Cal. 2/207 at 211.
People v. Honneycutt 29 Cal.2/52 at 60- L People v. Cornett 33Cal. 2/33at 41- 2.
16 - For a discussion of an instruction disapproved but not held eroneous see People
v. Kolez 23 Cal. 2/670. People v. Lindley 26 Cal. 2/780 at 794 co. 36 Cal. Law
Rev. 628 - 34.
any case, on the grounds of misdirection of the jury . . .
unless . . . the court shall be of the opinion that the
error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of jus-
tice. "
Under this section of the Constitution the Court
has found in some cases that, while the instructions
were erroneous, they did not under the facts of the
case operate to materially prejudice the defendant and
therefore are not reversible error. There are two
types of cases under consideration herein controlled
by this application of the Constitution by the Court.
The first group are the cases where the occasion (five
felonies) or the means (poison, etc.) determines the
degree of the crime. In these cases the trial court
has instructed the jury that the occasion or the means
carries with it a "conclusive presumption" of deliber-
ation and premediatation. This is error as we have
already seen. However, since the statute determines
by its own authority the degree of the murder, and the
jury could have come to no other conclusion as to the
degree or class of homicide had proper instructions
been given, there is no miscarriage of justice and the
conviction will not be set aside. 17
However, if the same instruction is given in a
case where a first degree murder verdict is dependent
upon finding of deliberation and premeditation, the
error would no longer be harmless. The statement in
the instruction that the "same test" is applied to a
willful, deliberated and premeditated killing is ap-
plied to an occasion or means killing is prejudicial
because of the confusion created in the minds of the
jury.
The second group are those cases wherein the de-
fendant was convicted of first degree murder on the
basis of the third category; i.e. a willful, deliberate
and premeditated killing. In these cases the relevant
error consists of the erroneous instructions relating
to the degree and class of homicide and provocation.
The Court has found that though the errors would nor-
mally be reversible, in some cases they are not preju-
dicial because the particular facts of the case show
that the jury acting as reasonable men could have come
17 - People v. Bernard 28 Cal. 2/207 at 214. People v. Honeycutt 29 Cal.
2/52 at 62. People v. Peterson 29 Cal. 2/69 at 78 - 9. People v.
Sanchez 30 Cal. 2/560 at 570.
to no other conclusion had the instructions been cor-
rect. 18 The latest cases indicate that the trend is to
reverse unless the evidence supporting a finding of de-
liberation and premeditation is unusually strong. 19
WHAT IS PROVOCATION
Generally speaking, under the facts of most homi-
cide cases, where the elements of malice aforethought,
deliberation, and premeditation control, provocation is
considered by the jury in determining those necessary
elements. Sufficient provocation can remove the.ele-
ment of malice aforethought thus reducing the crime to
voluntary manslaughter since malice aforethought is a
necessary part of murder of either degree. But if the
provocation is not sufficient to preclude malice afore-
thought, it might show lack of deliberation and premedi
tation, reducing the crime to murder in the second de-
gree. Prior to People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121,
there were two conflicting lines of cases in California
concerning provocation. One line held that:
" . . . neither provocation by words only, however oppo-
brious, nor contemptuous gestures without an assault upon
the person, nor any tresspass upon land or goods are of
themselves sufficient to reduce the offense of an inten-
tional homicide with a deadly weapon from murder to man-
sl augh te r. "20
The other line of cases stated that provocation
need not be of a particular type, but rather -
when it is committed under the influence of pas-
sion caused by an insult provocation sufficient to ex-
cite an irresistible passion in a reasonable man . . ." 21
The conflict between the two lines of cases is
apparent. In the latter group, any provocation which
would excite a reasonable man into a "heat of passion"
is sufficient to reduce the class or degree of the
homocide. The other line requires more than mere
words, etc., that is, an actual as.sault or something
similar. Neither line of cases contained a reference
18 - People v. Hilton 29 Cal2/217 at 222-3. People v. Tuthill3lCal. 2/92at 102-3.
19 - Compare People v. Hilton 29 Cal. 2/217 with People v. Cornett 33 Cal. 2/33.
20 - People v. Turley 50 Cal. 469 at 471. People v. Bruggy 93 Cal 476 at 481.
People v. Manzo 9 Cal. 2/594 at 599. People v. French 12 Cal. 2/720 at 744.
People v. Chutuk 18 Cal. App. 768 at 771. People v. Jackson 78 Cal. App. 442
at 448.
21 - Pebple v. Hurtado 63 Cal. 288 at 292. People v. Logan 175 Cal. 45.
People v. Golsh 63 Cal. App. 609 at 614. People v. Davis 92 Cal. App. 192 at 198.
to the other, and in People v. Vallentine the Court felt
the need for making a decision in favor of one or the
other and selected the more liberal view. The cases sup-
porting the stricter rule were based upon the common law
as embodied in the Crime and Punishments Act of 1850:
"In cases of voluntary manslaughter there must be a serious
and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing.
The Penal Code of 1872 carried no such limitation
though the Code Commissioner's notes included:
"No words of reproach, however grievous, are sufficient pro-
vocation to reduce an intentional homicide from murder to
manslaughter. "
The Court held that in spite of the Commissioner's notes,
the deletion from the code itself of the express limita-
tion of the Crime and Punishments Act should be inter-
preted as an intent on the part of the legislature to
remove the preexisting qualification. The Court is not
bound to apply common law concepts to the statute when
the latter is not merely a codification of the former.
Here there was an omission from the statute, which, when
considered in relation to the prior statute, would ap-
pear to be a modification of the common law. Conse-
quently it is now established that provocation may be
anything which would excite an "ordinarily reasonable
man" to a "heat of passion."
22
OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE
The reader has probably noted the customary legal
phrase "ordinarily reasonable man" in the preceeding
paragraph. The common law was fairly well settled as
favoring the objective view when considering provocation.
The mere fact that the defendant was in fact aroused to
a heat of passion was no defense unless an average man
of normal self control could have been aroused by the
same provocation. In the discussion of provocation in
People v. Vallentine supra at 136-144, the Court re-
peatedly used expressions indicating an adherence to the
reasonable man standard. The point was not in issue
however, and later cases do not follow a truly objective
approach. In People v. Wells 33 Cal. 2/330 at 345, the
Court held that evidence of a state of mind in the de-
fendant which would cause an abnormal reaction was not
admissible as pertaining to self defense for there the
reasonable man standard must apply. However, the
22 - People v. Vallentine 28 Cal. 2/121 at 136 - 44.
evidence was admissible as a fact to be considered by
the jury in determining whether malice aforethought and
premeditation were in fact present. In People v.
Danielly, 33 Cal. 2/362, the Court held otherwise on
what appears to be a similar fact situation. The Court
distinguishes the two cases because in the Danielly
case the proffered evidence of high nervous tension and
a psychoneurotic personality was not offered as affect-
ing the elements of malice aforethought, etc., and
there was no indication that the crime was committed
in a heat of passion. The Court affirmed the holding
in People v. Wells that evidence of the extraordinary
state of mind of the defendant is admissible in deter-
mining malice aforethought, deliberation and premedita-
tion. To that extent at least California has dropped
the reasonable man standard and adopted the subjective
view.
From the foregoing it can be seen that the com-
mon law concept of homicide is no longer the law in
California. Few, if any, of the old views remain.
Criticism may be levelled at the Court from some quart-
ers on the grounds that the decisions are judicial
legislation. However, it might be more accurate to
consider these decisions as merely repealing the judi-
cial legislation of the earlier courts that first
attached the common law concepts to the statutes. Cer-
tainly the confusion which was so troublesome to Mr.
James Pike is to a great extent alleviated, and re-
gardless of approval or disapproval, the fact remains
that the California homicide law is changed.
